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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The episteraological turn given to British philosophical thought
by Locke's misunderstanding of what Descartes meant by innate ideas led to a
development of theories of consciousness that has even now not ceased. The
great transformation scene from the empiricism of Locke through the subjective
idealism of Berkeley to the associationist scepticism of Hume is one of the
classic spectacles of modern philosophy. The ringing down of the curtain left
many spectators dissatisfied and prompted some to write revised versions for
future performance. The answers to Hume comprise a large portion of succeed-
ing thought.
Kant, who had yawned through the earlier acts, was roused to tremen-
dous and ponderous activity by Hume's denouement
,
and people are still wonder-
ing what modern philosophy would have been if Kant's slumbers had not been
disturbed.
Hume had some friends who attempted to defend and elaborate his posi-
tion. The writings of Hartley and the Mills are not only further statements
of Hume's doctrines but contain also vigorous onslaughts on his critics.
Among the keenest British opponents were the succession of writers
comprising the Scottish realists, who elaborated what they styled the philosophy
of common sense. Hume's conclusions were intellectually and morally repugnant.
They held that he ignored principles which we are forced to believe, by reason
of our nature and because we assume their operation in the daily business of
Hying. If Hume's logic led to conclusions that subverted these principles, the
trouble was evidently in his premises. But these premises Hume held in common
with Berkeley and Locke. Hence the new school was a reaction against the
dominant British thought of the time.
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Thomas Reid (1710-1796) laid the foundations of the new movement. He
had accepted the current Berkeleianism in college, but became in time deeply
suspicious of its tendencies, finally convincing himself, with the aid of Hume's
analysis, that it was "a hypothesis which, in my opinion, overturns all philoso-
phy, all religion and virtue, and all common sense" (96. a)*. "And the opinion
of the ablest judges seems to be", says Reid, that Berkeley "hath proved by
unanswerable agreements what no man in his senses can believe" (lOl.b), namely,
that "all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not
any subsistence without a mind, that their being (esse ) is to be perceived or
known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do
not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either
have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit "
(Berkeley: Principles of Human Knowledge . Part I. sec. VI).
Reid drew up a heavy indictment of this subjectivism: "Thus the wisdom
of philosophy is set in opposition to the common sense of mankind. The first
pretends to demonstrate apriori that there can be no such thing as a material
world; that sun, moon, stars, and earth, animal and vegetable bodies, are and
can be nothing else but sensations in the mind, or images of those sensations
in the memory and imagination; that, like pain and joy, they can have no exist-
ence when they are not thought of. The last can conceive no otherwise of this
opinion, than as a kind of metaphysical lunacy, and concludes that too much
learning is apt to make men mad; and that the man who seriously entertains this
Throughout this essay, a mere number and a letter in parenthesis are a reference
to page and column respectively of Reid ! s Collected Writings edited by Sir \
Wm. Hamilton. 6th ed. Edinburgh. 1863.
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belief, though in other respects he may be a very good man, as a man may be who
believes that he is made of glass; yet surely he hath a soft place in his un-
derstanding, and hath been hurt by much thinking" (127. a).
The battle ground Reid selected was consciousness. He aimed to show
that the mind is not shut in to knowledge of ideas, and that there is a material
world accessible to the mind and existing even when the mind is for the time
unconscious of it. His method was simple and direct. In the first place he
rejected the theory that reality is represented in the mind by ideas. This
destroyed Locke's theory of knowledge and left Berkeley with a mind devoid of
content. It destroyed also Hume's bundles of impressions and ideas. In the
second place Reid insisted on the independent reality of the external world.
Locke's mind could therefore know this world directly without the intervention
of ideas, Berkeley's had to know the world if it was to know anything at all,
while Hume's metaphysical lunacy was too aggravated to make a cure likely of
success.
Reid regarded the doctrine that the mind has representative ideas
as the citadel of the system he had resolved to overthrow. This essay is
largely a study of Reid's assaults on the 'ideal hypothesis' and of his realis-
tic reconstruction of the phenomena of knowing. It seeks to point out that
Reid '8 failure to establish realism is due in the main to his acceptance of
the hypothesis of mind as a thing or agent. This is the bulwark of subjectivism
that must be destroyed if the dominance of the school is to cease.
In the spheres of sensation and perception, of memory and of imagina-
tion,, Reid's procedure is essentially the same. He loudly denounces the sub-
jective position, vehemently proclaims the realistic substitute, and then set-
tles down to support his contention in a manner that inevitably leads back to
subjectivism again, if it is pressed but a few points beyond the situation in

4which he leaves it. This surprising result is traced in this essay to his
failure to reject the mind-substance hypothesis. The implications of this
doctrine are set forth in a separate chapter and held to be responsible for
the inability of his successors to remedy his fundamental contradictions.
Finally the attempt is made to sketch the pragmatic reaction against subject-
ivism,, in order to see whether rejection of the mind-entity conception can not
lead to a tenable doctrine of consciousness which shall embody Reid's two
leading stipulations, that representative ideas do not intervene in the knowing
of external reality, and that the external world exists independently of the
knowledge of it.
Should the pragmatic reconstruction be deemed sound, it would then
be evident that the Scottish realists failed, not because they were too radical
in their onslaught on idealism, but because they were not revolutionary enough.
They were unable to shake off all the unverifiable assumptions foisted on them
as part of their education. Their common sense, like all other common sense,
was fatally uncritical of its own position. But they led the advance. Their
unsuccessful attack revealed the central stronghold of idealism and helped to
make possible the renewed assault of the present day.

-5-
CHAPTER II
SENSATION AND PERCEPTION
Theories of consciousness afford a convenient means for classifying
philosophical systems,, Just as theories of obligation permit one to distin-
guish fundamentally between moral systems. What are we conscious of? Probably
to no other question in philosophy have so many divergent answers been given.
It is asserted that we are conscious of matter and mind, of matter only, of
mind only, of matter through mind, of mind through matter, of many minds, of
our mind alone. It is also held that the very question, 'what are we conscious
of?' makes assumptions that invalidate any possible answer. Consciousness
far from being a power within ourselves that plays on objects or ideas at our
will, is really a grouping, togetherness, pattern, or cross section of things,
one of which is the body. In this view, the relevant question is not, 'what
are we conscious of? 1 but rather, 'by what principle of selection do some
things appear in the grouping while others do not?' Philosophers that unite
in ignoring the first question divide in answering the second. In some way
or other the body is an essential factor in the selective process. Explana-
tions range from the blank statement, that the body is a unique center of
reference, through various descriptions of bodily response, to the position, that
consciousness is the name given to any situation in which an organism responds
to anticipated results as foreshadowed in the objects towhich it responds. If
philosophy is to deal with reality, it must show how reality can be reached,
and this is the problem to be met by theories of knowledge or of consciousness.
Since every philosopher either adopts explicitly or assumes an
epistemology he thereby classifies himself much more conclusively than by a
formal labeling of his other doctrines. A man who ranks himself as a natural
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realist and holds to the immediate knowledge of matter, for example, will not
save himself from unwilling fellowship with the subjective idealists if his
theory of sense perception., as actually worked out, shuts off the mind from
all direct contact with matter, leaving only an indirect relation through
subjective things called sensations or ideas. On the other hand, an idealistic
philosophy that rejects everything non-mental, and yet makes use of a brain
and nervous system outside the mind in an endeavor to put everything within
the mind, classifies itself by virtue of its theory of sense perception and
not by its invalid general conclusions.
Reid is a representative of the first type. His pages ring with
the firm conviction that subjective idealism and its inevitable sequel in
...
scepticism have been refuted and supplanted by the common sense doctrine of
immediate awareness of the external object. He pours scorn and pity upon
his predecessors in modern philosophy because of their attachment to the
•ideal hypothesis', by which he means a representative theory of sense per-
Iception. They had supposed that the only way in which the non-extended mind
could perceive an extended object was by means of ideas that represented the
extended object to the non-extended mind*.
The successive thought of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume had made evident
the solipsistic or else sceptical nature of this doctrine. The ideas were
present, to be sure, but who could guarantee that they represented truly,
or at all? Isolated from external reality, the mind was at the mercy of its
possibly inaccurate, nay perhaps unscrupulous, ideas.
This was a ridiculous and intolerable situation to Reid. He solved
it, in Alexander's fashion, by declaring flatly that the mind does perceive
external reality directly, and that it is not hemmed in by impenetrable ideas.
But while Gordian knots may be cut by conquerors of the world and by rhetori-
^See Holt: Concept of Consciousness , p. 136-149. N.Y. 1914.
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cians, a philosopher, if he is true to his faith, must patiently undo the
tangle step by step. When Reid came to this part of his task he experienced
the greatest difficulty in avoiding the very 'ideal hypothesis' that he had
summarily rejected. In fact,, it is demonstrable that this wolf, in a new
suit of sheep's clothing furnished by Reid, reentered the fold and worked
his sceptical and solipsistic havoc on the author's choicest lambs. This
chapter is, accordingly, an attempt to show that Reid' 8 philosophy of common
sense, though a natural realism in its claims, is, at least with regard to its
theory of sense-perception, an unqualified subjectivism of the same crude
type as that of Locke.
"An inquiry into the human mind, on the principles of common sense"
undertook the explanation of the phenomena of sense perception, as Reid viewed
them. Eight "Essays on the intellectual powers of man" covered the same ground
and much more, but without essential change in doctrine. From these works, by
quotation and summary Reid's theory will be presented and then examined.
We all know roughly what is meant by experiencing a smell. Even
though we can not describe what is going on, we are aware of the difference to
our nostrils between a pea cannery and a florist's rose greenhouse, between
a lady who perfumes and a gentleman who smokes. Some we like and some we do
not like, but all of them we smell.
With this appeal to common experience Reid launches his theory.
Whatever else we may believe, we must grant, he thinks, that the smell-sensa-
tion is "a simple and original affection or feeling of the mind It is,
indeed, impossible that it can be in any material body: it is a sensation,
and a sensation can only be in a sentient thing" (105. a). This important point
is made several times, until it is evident beyond a doubt that Reid believed a
sensation to be a something in the mind and nowhere else, dependent on the mind
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for ita existence,, and having a real existence only under those conditions.
"This is common to all sensations, that, as they can not exist
but in being perceived, so they can not be perceived but they must exist"
(105. b). "It is certain, no man can conceive or believe smelling to exist
of itself, without a mind, or something that has the power of smelling, of
which it is called a sensation, an operation, or feeling" (108. a). The posi-
tion may be consolidated by an absolutely unequivocal quotation from his later
essays: "When I smell a rose, there is in this operation both sensation and
perception. The agreeable odor I feel, considered by itself, without relation
to any external object, is merely a sensation. It affects the mind in a certain
way; and this affection of the mind may be conceived, without a thought of the
rose, or of any other object. The sensation can be nothing else than it is
felt to be. Its very essense consists in being felt; and, when it is not felt,
it is not. There is no difference between the sensation and the feeling of
it - they are one and the same thing. It is for this reason that we before
observed, that, in sensation, there is no object distinct from that act of
the mind by which it is felt - and this holds true with regard to all sensa-
tions" (310. a).
The first result secured by analysis of sense-perception is, there-
fore, the purely subjective or mental character of sensations.
The next step should lead us to the external world, the realm of
things outside the mind, in short to matter, or, as Reid terms it, body. But
since the path from a subjective sensation to an objective reality is so
difficult that Locke, like Columbus, never realized his failure to reach the
goal, while Berkeley and Hume roundly maintained that no such path existed,
we must not expect Reid to guide us without much faltering and retracing of
steps, ending, perhaps, despite his sincerest efforts,in evident failure to carry
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out his undertaking. He begins:
"We have considered smell as signifying a sensation, feeling, or
impression upon the mind; and in this sense, it can only be in a mind, or
sentient being; but it is evident that mankind give the name of smell much
more frequently to something which they conceive to be external, and to be
a quality of body: they understand by it something which does not at all infer
a mind; and have not the least difficulty in conceiving the air perfumed with
aromatic odors in the deserts of Arabia, or in some uninhabited island where
the human foot never trod I am apt to think that there is really some-
thing in the rose or lily, which is by the vulgar called smell, and which con-
tinues to exist when it is not smelled: and shall proceed to inquire what this
is; how we come by the notion of it; and what relation this quality or virtue
of smell hath to the sensation which we have been obliged to call by the same
name, for want of another" (112. a-b).
The results of this inquiry are in brief these: (1) the something-in-
the-rose has a permanent existence independent of the mind; (2) we come by the
notion of it through 'suggestion 1 on the part of the sensation, of which (3) it
is the cause (114. a).
The second conclusion is of fundamental importance for the theory of
sense-perception, and requires careful statement before it can be fairly criti-
cized. The problem is very much complicated by Reid's lack of clearness and
consistency in his remarks on this topic. Hamilton has collected the principal
relevant passages and divided them into two groups, the first supporting the
position that Reid was a representational perceptualist, the second that he
was, as he constantly proclaimed himself to be, a new leader in the school of
direct or immediate perception (819.a-824). In spite of Hamilton's attempt
to minimize the force of the first group in the interests of "natural realism",
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quotation will quickly show Reid's inability to free himself from the current
represent ationism. This oscillation is evidently due to the struggle within
him between his early idealistic training and his realistic program. He saw
the promised land but knew not how to reach it. Throughout his work is evident
the shifting from a 'suggested 1 reality to one actually present to the mind,
according as he was occupied with the means to his end or with the end itself.
The immediate question is not so much what is the external reality,
as how do we get our knowledge of it. We are interested for the moment in the
actual working of the knowing process, rather than in the nature of its product.
Whenever Reid tries to explain the process he resorts to statements like these:
"How a sensation should instantly make us conceive and believe the
existence of an external thing altogether unlike to it, I do not pretend to
know; and when I say that the one suggests the other, I mean not to explain
the manner of their connection, but to express a fact, which everyone may be
conscious of - namely, that by a law of our nature, such a conception and belief
constantly and immediately follow the sensation" (131.b).
"Perception has always an external object, and the object of my
perception, in this case, is that quality in the rose which I discern by the
sense of smell. Observing that the agreeable sensation is raised when the rose
is near, and ceases when it is removed, I am led by my nature to conclude some
quality to be in the rose, which is the cause of this sensation. This quality
in the rose is the object perceived; and that act of my mind by which I have the
conviction and belief of this quality, is what in this case I call perception"
(310. a). Hamilton remarks in a footnote, "This paragraph appears to be an
explicit disavowal of the doctrine of an intuitive or immediate perception"
(310. b*).
" there are natural suggestions: particularly, that seneation
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suggests the notion of present existence, and the belief that what we perceive
or feel does now exist" (lll.b).
" our constitution leads us to consider it £the sensation] as a
sign of something external, which hath a constant conjunction with it" (114. b).
"The sensations of heat and cold ars perfectly known; for they
neither are nor can be anything else than what we feel them to be; but the qual-
ities in bodies which we call heat and cold are unknown. They are only conceived
by us as unknown causes or occasions of the sensations to which we give the
same names" (119.b). This account applies to all secondary qualities and their
corresponding sensations (314 .b).
The following applies to all primary qualities and their corresponding
sensations, except the quality of visible shape, which has no peculiar sensa-
tion: "Hardness of bodies is a thing that we conceive as distinctly and believe
as firmly as anything in nature. We have no means of coming at this conception
and belief, but by means of a certain sensation of touch to which hardness
hath not the least similitude; ncr can we by any rules of reasoning infer the
one from the other What shall we say then of this conception and this
belief which are so unaccountable and intractable? I see nothing left but to
conclude that by an original principle of our constitution a certain sensation
of touch both suggests to the mind the conception of hardness and creates the
belief of it: or in other words that this sensation is a natural sign of hard-
ness" (121. a). 2 "All these [primary qualities]
,
by means of certain cor-
responding sensations of touch, are presented to the mind as real external
2The distinction between primary and secondary qualities, drawn by Locke on the
basis of resemblance or non-resemblance between the idea (sensation) and its
external cause, has been redrawn by Reid on the basis of our knowledge or
ignorance of the external cause of the sensation (123. a; 313.b). That this
boundary is neither fixed nor of practical importance though denied by Reid
is being constantly demonstrated by the progress of physical and chemical
analysis.
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qualities; the conception and the belief of them are invariably connected with
the corresponding sensations by an original principle of human nature" (123. b).
n I know this also, that the perception of an object implies both a
conception of its form and a belief of its present existence. I know moreover
that this belief is not the effect of argumentation and reasoning; it is the
immediate effect of my constitution" (183. a).
"There is no reasoning in perception, ae hath been observed. The belief
which is implied in it is a kind of instinct" (185. a).
" though we never before had any notion or conception of the thing
signified, £sensations^ do suggest, or conjure it up, as it were, by a natural
kind of magic, and at once give us a conception and create a belief of it"
(122. a).
"We know nothing of the machinery by means of which each sensa-
tion exhibits its corresponding perception. We are inspired with the sensation,
and we are inspired with the corresponding perception by means unknown. And
because the mind passes immediately from the sensation to that conception and
belief of the object which we have in perception, in the same manner as it
passes from signs to the things signified by them, we have therefore called
our sensations signs of external objects" (187. b- 188. a).
"When a primary quality is perceived, the sensation immediately leads
our thought to the quality signified by it, and is itself forgot" (315.b).
"The external senses have a double province - to make us feel and
to make us perceive. They furnish us with a variety of sensations, some pleas-
ant, others painful, and others indifferent; at the same time they give us
a conception and an invincible belief of the existence of external objects.
This conception of external objects is the work of nature. The belief of their
existence which the senses give is the work of nature; so likewise is the sensa-
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tion that accompanies it. This conception and belief which nature produces by
means of the senses we call perception" (3l4.b).
"Nature has connected our perception of external objects with certain
sensations. If the sensation is produced the corresponding perception follows
even when there is no object and in that case is apt to deceive us. In like
manner nature has connected our sensations with certain impressions that are made
upon the nerves and brain; and when the impression is made, from whatever
cause, the corresponding sensation and perception immediately follow" (320. b).
The essence of these numerous quotations appears to be that sensa-
tions, 'by a natural kind of magic', conjure up a belief in the existence
of the external objects that correspond to the sensations. The sensation is
said to suggest, to exhibit, to signify, to lead to, to make us conceive and
believe the existence of the object. Knowledge of how this i6 accomplished
is expressly disclaimed. The process is instinctive, non-rational, 'natural 1
,
in accordance with original principles of the human constitution, and so on.
The question, how do we get our knowledge of external reality, is overborne
by the triumphant assertion that, in any case, get it we do.
However, Reid's gropings toward an explanation are not entirely vain.
Every time he attacks the problem his procedure reveals assumptions of great
importance for the discovery of his implicit, as distinguished from his
avowed, theory of knowledge. Its discovery and construction, which will now be
attempted, almost unequivocally affiliates him with the subjective idealists,
leaving his realism in the dreamer's paradise of unsubstantiated wishes, or at
most as a faint indication to the pragmatic philosophy of the terms in which
a convincing answer to Hume must be framed.
The entire idealistic apparatus is produced in his argument piece
by piece, and needs only to be assembled. At the outset we are furnished with
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purely subjective sensations. These are then placed where they belong, in a
mental thing distinct from the body, a substantial mind, itself an active entity.
The fatal implications of this factor in Reid's system are exhibited in a later
chapter. The existence of the external world as immediately known, Reid pre-
sumes, will save him from scepticism or solipsism. But at this point he is
indistinguishable from the subjective idealist, except in his bare assertions
that he is completely different. The machinery of 'suggestion' is useless for
effecting the transition from the sensation in the mind to the perceived object
without, because it works just as smoothly and produces the same result when
the object is not 'there', as when it is (320. b). The idealist cites this as
proof that the object is, under the law of parsimony, never really there, and
that our perceptions are, not simply in a few cases but in all cases, subjective.
Reid is content to observe that the senses are sometimes "apt to deceive us M
,
forgetful of his stout defense elsewhere (334. a) of the veracity of the senses.
Apart from the uncertainty produced by the fact of error and hallu-
cination, what is 'suggestion' in its normal working? Although the subject
is wrapped in obscurity owing to Reid's reiterated professions of ignorance,
it nevertheless appears that the subjective sensation possesses an attribute
capable of inducing in the mind the conception and belief of the external
object. If this function were one of leading the mind to the object itself,
and if it were another object instead of a sensation that performed this func-
tion, then Reid would have to be considered as an astonishing forerunner of the
pragmatists. As the case actually stands, however, he is badly enmeshed in the
idealist ' s net,for,afta- the 'suggesting' is accomplished, the mind is advanced
only to the conception and belief of the object, not to the object itself,
'Suggestion' seems to be a name for a special association of ideas, the associa-
tion of ideas of qualities with ideas of causes of these qualities and with
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ideas of the external existence of these causes. But the whole operation is
(purely subjective none the less.
Reid's inquiry into the relation of the subjective smell of a rose,
which is a sensation in the mind, to the external quality or virtue of smell in
Ithe rose itself had the triple result that the quality in the rose, though
independently existing
?
was suggested to the mind by the sensation it had produced.
The second conclusion has been examined, the first and third still demand
consideration.
The propositions that there is an external something and that this
causes sensations in the mind are closely connected. The first would scarcely
be entertained by anyone holding Reid's real theory of perception "but for the
last. This in turn arises, according to Reid, "because "the mind begins very
early to thirst after principles which may direct it in the exertion of its
powers" (112. b), and because of "an eager desire to find out connections in
things" (113. a), or, in Hume's words, because of the intemperate searching after
\
causes.
If we look into Reid's treatment of this phase of perception we shall
find a very pretty begging of the question which deserves to be exposed. He
says (112.b), "Let us therefore suppose, as before, a person beginning to exer-
cise the sense of smelling; a little experience will discover to him, that the
nose is the organ of this sense, and that the air, or something in the air, is
a medium of it. And finding by farther experience that, when a rose is near,
he has a certain sensation, when it is removed the sensation is gone, he finds
a connection in nature betwixt the rose and this sensation. The rose is con-
sidered as a cause, occasion, or antecedent of the sensation, the sensation as
an effect or consequence of the presence of the rose; they are associated in the
mind, and constantly found conjoined in the imagination" (see also 310. a).
if
1
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Thore is sua ancient recipe which begins, First catch your rabbit.
This should remind us that we must first have our rose before we can go on and
find a connection in nature betwixt it and the sensation. How does the rose
come into our possession? It is necessary to consider what is meant by 'having
a rose near 1 . It may mean having the actual external rose as an object in
consciousness, or having a group of subjective sensations of color, smell, shape,
touch, tenperature, etc., usually appearing in conjunction and known collectively
by the name rose. The realist is compelled to uphold the first meaning, the
idealist of course takes the second. If it can be shown that Reid, while
verbally supporting the first, gives no grounds for believing any but the second
interpretation, it will be evident that he assumes what he set out to prove,
namely the existence of the external world, and that he is once more, though
j
ostensibly in opposition, fundamentally allied with the idealist in his theory
of sense perception.
His common starting point with the idealist of Berkeley's kind is
the subjective smell-sensation. Berkeley connects it with other subj sc tive
sensations, Reid with the real rose. He appears to know that there is a real
rose because various sensations 'suggest' the conception and belief of it to I
him. This position has already been criticized. It simmers down to an associa-
tion of ideas only, not an association of object with idea.
There remains his contention that the sensation is referred to an
j
external cause on account of the mind's eager desire to find out connections
in things. Granted this longing, why should the mind establish the relation
with something outside? Because the thing happens to be there waiting to be I
connected to the sensation, and when it is not there, there is no sensation
dangling unrelated either. But this begs the question shamelessly. Something
is there, to be sure, but is it external or simply other sensations? We are
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given no evidence for the first alternative while everything points to the
second. To specify: The rose, apart from the smell sensation, 'produces'
also other sensations. But there is no reason to believe that an external
urknown 'produces' them. It is more reasonable to hold that the rose is.
these sensations. A sensation, besides, is more easily connected with other
sensations than with something else. And there are all the facts of relativity
of perception helping to put the rose in the mind, rather than 'out there'.
So far, accordingly, from having led us out of the world of subjec-
tive sensations into the world of objective reality, Reid has exhibited sen-
sations guaranteeing each other without further apparent support, like two
amazing acrobats, each holding the other up in mid-air. The smell sensation
is referred to the group of remaining rose sensations, the color sensation
in turn likewise, the weight sensation in its order, each one being singled
out for the moment to be undergirded by the others, then itself subsiding
into the group to help bear up its Buccessor. This is the subjective maze
from which we hoped to emerge under Reid's guidance. He has expended much
energy, but done little work.
Some good results remain nevertheless in the midst of much futility.
IThe pragmatic reconstruction of Scottish realism will be attempted in the last
chapter, but a brief anticipation of it follows naturally from all the fore-
going criticism. The two exceptional features in Reid's account, marking it
as a departure in spirit at least if not in execution from the 'ideal hypothe-
Isis',
are his insistence that the external object is present to the mind direct-
ly, and his suggestion-theory to make this plausible.
These features the pragmatist can utilize as cornerstones in the
rebuilding. He retains the claim of immediate awareness as valid, he remodels
the machinery of suggestion, and he rejects the entitative or substantial mind

——~—~ ——
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to which, Raid thought, the external objects appeared. Objects are present
to the responsive body. If the response is of a kind involving 'suggestion'
it is known as conscious or mental. Mind is therefore a function, not a
thing. Sensations do not 'suggest' the presence of objects to the mind. The
object itself, present in some form from the start, suggests possibilities
to the body. When the body responds to these suggestions of the future it
functions consciously. The external object leads the body on in a way that is
not mechanical, but due "to the original constitution of our nature", as Reid
rightly says. Response to the ftiture is a quality definitely belonging to some
things, absent in others.
The reconstruction of perception must be postponed until Reid's
views of other mental phenomena have been presented and examined.
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CHAPTER III
MEMORY AND IMAGINATION.
While many a realist makes a brave start toward his goal when he
frames his theory of sense perception, he often meets unusual difficulty in
proceeding to account for memory and imagination. There is first of all the
general problem, dismaying to philosophers irrespective of school, of finding
any explanation for the pastness of memory-ob j ects on the one hand, and the
apparent datelessness of imagination-objects on the other. Then the realist
suffers an aggravation of the general problem from the special necessity
he is under of explaining these operations in a way that will not undermine
the independence of his external world. He must beware lest a facile theory
be extended to include objects of sense perception which by the realistic
hypothesis are immediately present at the same time that they are independent.
Any account of memory-objects must scrupulously preserve sense-objects from
the infection of subjectivity; against imagination the quarantine must be
even more vigilant. From the consideration of objects that have been, but
are no more, and of objects that never were, though they may yet be, the
descent to abysmal representationism is easy and the return desperately hard.
Having failed grievously to establish his doctrine of sense per-
ception, Reid rather exceeds expectations by proposing a drastically realistic
theory of memory. So uncompromising is it that Hamilton refuses to accept
it. The evidence, as usual, does not point all in one direction, but is
divisible into two main groups, one indicating Reid's realistic desires, the
other his implicit ineluctable subjectivism. It is unfortunate for his doc-
trine that his wish is generally impotent to be the father of his thought.
Passages showing his strong and earnest realistic bias follow:
"Suppose that once and only onee I smelled a tuberose in a certain
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room whore it grew in a pot and gave a very grateful perfume. Next day I relate
what I saw and smelled. When I attend as carefully as I can to what passes
in my mind in this case, it appears evident that the very thing I saw yester-
day, and the fragrance I smelled are now the immediate objects of mind, when I
remember it Upon the strictest attention, memory appears to me to have
things that are past, and not present ideas, for its object I beg leave
to think, with the vulgar, that when I remember the smell of the tuberose,
that very sensation which I had yesterday and which has now no more any exist-
ence is the immediate object of my memory there was a smell, is the im-
mediate testimony of memory" (106. a).
"The immediate object of perception must be something present, and
not what is past. We may remember what is past, but do not perceive it"
(222. a). This carries the implication that the immediate object of memory
is what is past, for otherwise it need not he distinguished from the immediate
object of perception.
"If we compare the evidence of sense with that of memory, we find a
great resemblance, but still some difference. I remember distinctly to have
dined yesterday with such a company. What is the meaning of this? It is that
I have a distinct conception and firm belief of this past event, not by reason-
ing, not by testimony, but immediately from my constitution. And I give the
name of memory to that part of my constitution by which I have this kind of
conviction of past events. I see a chair on my right hand. What is the meaning
of this? It is that I have by my constitution a distinct conception and firm
belief of the present existence of the chair in such a place and in such a po-
sition; and I give the name of seeing to that part of my constitution by which
I have this immediate conviction. The two operations agree in the immediate
conviction which they give" (329. b). While this quotation is not crucial, it
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has this contingent force, that memory is in the same relation to its object
as is perception, and therefore if perception is immediate, so in the same
degree is memory.
"It is by memory that we have an immediate knowledge of things past"
(339. a). A more explicit statement of the position is impossible. It excited
the annotative wrath of Hamilton, who remarked in a footnote: "An immediate
knowledge of a past thing is a contradiction. For we can only know a thing
immediately, if we know it in itself, or as existing; but what is past can-
not be known in itself, for it is nonexistent." This stricture must be con-
sidered later.
"The faculties of consciousness £the modern self-consciousness}
(222. b)] and memory are chiefly distinguished by this, that the first is an
immediate knowledge of the present, the second an immediate knowledge of the
past" (351. b). This exhausted Hamilton's patience. He subjoined a note read-
ing: "As already frequently stated, an immediate knowledge of the p_ast is
contradictory. This observation I cannot again repeat." Hamilton seemed not
to share Reid's apparent opinion that reiteration of a conviction is equiva-
lent to demonstration.
"The testimony of memory, like that of £self
-J
consciousness is im-
mediate; it claims our assent upon its own authority" (444.b).
The perplexing feature of Reid's treatment of memory is the fact that
his utterances giving ground for a representative doctrine often occur in the
same context as those quoted above in favor of immediacy. Let us reproduce pas-
sages tending toward representationisra and therefore, ultimately, subjectivism:
" memory suggests the notion of past existence, and the belief
that what we remember did exist in time past" (lll.b).
"The object of memory or thing remembered must be something that is
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past What now is cannot be an object of memory.... Memory is always ac-
companied with the belief of that which we remember,, every man feels that
he must believe what he distinctly remembers, though he can give no other reason
of his belief but that he remembers the thing distinctly.... This belief which
we have from distinct memory we account real knowledge" (340. a). Here, in the
belief that accompanies memory, is the entering wedge of represent ationism. To
remember a thing is not enough, there must be a belief in the past existence
of what is remembered. The belief is held because the thing is remembered,
though that, as Reid admits, is no reason at all, since the connection is not
necessary, but arbitrary and unaccountable (341. b).
"The belief which we have in perception is a belief of the present
existence of the object, that which we have in memory is a belief of its past
existence" (198. b).
"I find this also, that the sensation compels my belief of the present
existence of the smell, and memory my belief of its past existence If you
ask why I believe that it existed yesterday, I can give no other reason but
that I remember it" (106. b).
These passages and the one from 329. b quoted in the other group (p. 20)
make it appear that memory and perception are on the same operating basis. In
perception there is a suggested belief that a thing exists in the world of
external realities. In memory there is a suggested belief that a thing exists
in the world of past and bygone realities. The belief in both operations
accompanies them as a result of the constitution of our nature, arbitrary and
unaccountable. If, therefore, the criticism of the suggestion-machinery of
perception, as developed in the preceding chapter, is sufficient to show the
subjective character of that process in the form presented by Reid, this
criticism is equally valid when applied to the suggestion-machinery of memory.
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In some mysterious way, to be investigated next, memory lays hold of a no longer
existing object and then suggests to the mind a belief in that object's past
existence. Again the suggesting is not a leading of the mind to the real
object; it is a working on the mind in such a way that belief in the real ob-
ject is produced. And again there are admittedly circumstances when a belief
that has no corresponding real object is aroused (340. a; 362. a). Could any-
thing be more completely 'in the mind' than a belief suggested by a mental opera-
tion and duly appearing whether there is really anything to be believed or
not?
Discarding those of Reid's remarks that lean toward representationism,
we are left with those in which, much to Hamilton's annoyance, the immediacy
of memory is vociferated.
Reid's realistic instinct was altogether correct in the demand it
made for the presence in some manner of the object remembered. But unaided
instinct is a poor pilot through the tortuous channels of epistemology . Hamil-
ton is justified in maintaining that what is past cannot, since it is non-
existent, be known immediately, and that Reid's doctrine as it stands is a
contradiction in itself. It was Reid's business to show that the contradic-
tion is merely apparent, not real, that the object is actually present, though
absent. No amount of asseveration, however, could take the place of explana-
tion. That the needed demonstration is available will be shown in the last
chapter. That Reid could not possibly have furnished it while burdened with the
incubus of an entitative mind will be made plain in the next chapter. Mean-
while the subject of imagination requires consideration.
Imagination involves the same kind of danger for the unwary realist
as memory. The temptation to explain it subjectively, at the expense of the
objective character of perception, lies on the surface. The peril is magnified

by the circumstance that imagination may deal with things that, unlike remem-
bered things, have no place in the time continuum apart from the brute date
of their being imagined.
Reid defines and describes imagination clearly, but explains it not
at all:
"Conceiving, imagining, and apprehending are commonly used as synony-
mous in our language, and signify the same thing which the logicians call
simple apprehension |denied by Hamilton (106. b*)J. This is an operation differ-
ent from all those we have mentioned. Whatever we perceive, whatever we re-
member, whatever we are [ self-} conscious of, we have a full persuasion or con-
viction of its existence. But we may conceive or imagine what has no existence,
and what we firmly believe to have no existence. What never had an existence
cannot be remembered; what has no existence at present cannot be the object
of perception or of [ self consciousness; but what never had nor has any exist-
ence may be conceived. Every man knows that it is as easy to conceive a winged
horse or a centaur as it is to conceive a horse or a man. Let it be observed
therefore that to conceive, to imagine, to apprehend, when taken in the proper
sense, signify an act of the mind which implies no belief or judgment at all.
It is an act of the mind by which nothing is affirmed or denied, and which
therefore can neither be true nor false" (223. a. See also 105. b; 106. b; 361. a;
368. a).
What is imagination? "It is an act of the mind, a kind of thought.
This cannot be denied. But does it produce any effect besides the act itself?
Surely common sense answers this question in the negative; for everyone knows
that it is one thing to conceive, another thing to bring forth into effect....
Conceiving [ or imagining^, as well as projecting or resolving, are what the
schoolmen called immanent acts of the mind which produce nothing beyond them-
It
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selves" (363. a). Here is impregnable subjectivism. Imagination is purely an
act of the mind and one that has not the least effect outside the mind.
Precisely what this active mind is must be considered later. It is evident
at any rate that is is a power capable of acting independently of and non-
reciprocally with the material world.
In this light may be examined a passage, already quoted in part, com-
paring and contrasting three distinct acts of the mind:
".....When I remember the smell of the tuberose, that very sensation
which I had yesterday, and which has now no more any existence, is the immed-
iate object of my memory; and when I imagine it present, the sensation itself,
and not any idea of it, is the object of my imagination. But though the object
of my sensation £ perception^ , memory and imagination be in this case the same,
yet these acts or operations of the mind are as different and as easily dis-
tinguishable as smell, taste and sound. I am. conscious of a difference in kind
between sensation and memory, and between both and imagination. I find this
also, that the sensation compels my belief of the present existence of the
smell, and memory my belief of its past existence. There is a smell, is the
immediate testimony of sense; there was a smell, is the immediate testimony
of memory. If you ask me why I believe that the smell exists, I can give no
other reason nor shall ever be able to give any other than that I smell it. If
you ask why I "believe that it existed yesterday, I can give no other reason
but that I remember it. Sensation and memory therefore are simple, original
and perfectly distinct operations of the mind, and both of them are original
principles of belief. Imagination is distinct frorr both, but is no principle
of belief. Sensation implies the present existence of its object, memory its
past existence, but imagination views its object naked, and without any belief
of its existence or nonexistence" (106. a).
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The points of importance are two. First, the distinguishing features
of the three operations are the presence of absence of particular varieties
of belief. Given a sensation in Reid's strictly subjective meaning,, and we
can serve it up as perception if we season it with a belief in the present
existence of the object, or we can offer it as memory if we add a belief in the
past existence of the object, while it appears as imagination if brought in
au naturel without any dressing of belief. And what is this condiment of
belief? "Every man knows what it is, but no man can define it" (107. a).
"I conclude then that the belief which accompanies sensation and memory is a
simple act of the mind which cannot be defined" (107.b). By a species of
mental alchemy a subjective sensation becomes objectified either in the present
or the past by mixing it with a mental act called belief. If imagination is
subjective, the classification of perception and memory appears obvious.
The second point is the assertion that imagination has an object,
not represented by an idea. Thus in the case of the tuberose, the smell which
is actually present in perception, is also itself the object of the imagination.
This position is reinforced in another passage of considerable length, but
great importance:
"If now it should be asked, What is the idea of a circle? I answer,
It is the conception £ or imagination ]of a circle. What is the immediate ob-
ject of this conception? The immediate and the only object of it is a circle.
But where is this circle? It is nowhere. If it was an individual and had a
real existence, it must have a place; but being a universal, it has no existence
and therefore no place. Is it not in the mind of him that conceives it? The
conception of it is in the mind, being an act of the mind; and in common lan-
guage a thing being in the mind is a figurative expression signifying that the
thing is conceived or remembered.
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"It may be asked, Whether this conception is an image or resemblance
of a circle. I answer, I have accounted for its being in a figurative sense
called the image of a circle in the mind. If the question is meant in the
literal sense, we must observe that the word conception has two meanings. Pro-
perly it signifies that operation of the mind which we have been endeavoring
to explain; but sometimes it is put for the object of conception or thing
conceived.
"Now if the question be understood in the last of these senses, the
object of this conception is not an image or resemblance of a circle; for it is
a circle, and nothing can be an image of itself.
"If the question be - Whether the operation of mind in conceiving
a circle be an image or resemblance of a circle? I think it is not; and that
no two things can be more perfectly unlike than a species of thought and a
species of figure. Nor is it more strange that conception should have no resem-
blance to the object conceived, than that desire should have no resemblance
to the object desired, or resentment to the object of resentment.
"I can likewise conceive an individual object that really exists, such
as St. Paul's Church in London. I have an idea of it, that is, I conceive it.
The immediate object of this conception is four hundred miles distant, and I
have no reason to think that it acts upon me, or that I act upon it; but I can
think of it notwithstanding" (374. a).
The force of this extended quotation lies in its sturdy insistence
on the existence of some object of the imagination, even though that object
be nonexistent. So stated, we have a contradiction like the one that irritated
Hamilton in Reid's discussion of memory. Here again it was Reid's business
to show that, though verbally a contradiction, the fact nevertheless remains
that in imagination th6 object, even when nonexistent, is still in some manner
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p resent. But Reid simply let the contradiction stand, repeating his contention
without supporting it. He could not do more with a substantial mind on his
overburdened shoulders.
Had Reid lived to benefit by the pragmatic revelation he might have
resolved his two contradictions somewhat in this wise:
Both memory and imagination are special forms of consciousness.
Both, therefore, are types of bodily response to future coneequences displayed
by the stimulus to which the body responds. It is correct, consequently, to
speak, as Reid does, of perception, memory, and imagination having on occasion
the selfsame object, and correct furthermore to regard this object as immediate
and not as represented by ideas. Reid's difficulty lay in his inability to
explain how any response was possible to an object no longer existent or to
on6 that was possibly entirely nonexistent. In other words his task was to
distinguish memory and imagination from percept ion, and this he could not carry
further than the dogged declaration that they were patently different and
must not be confused.
in all three cases the object is present, but not to the 'mind*. It
is present to the body in the form of a control to which the body responds. How
the different types of consciousness that go by the names perception, memory,
and imagination, are to be distinguished is the content of the final chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
THE MINI)
Scottish realism was committed to the conception of mind that makes
it a substance, or entity, or thing, existing in its own right, and not de-
pendent for its reality, as a process or function must be, on the continued
existence, in dynamic relation, of independently existing things. An apple,
for example, is a thing, but the process of rotting can exist only when there
is an apple to decay. Heid held that mind existed as a thing, not simply as
a process. After the necessary quotations in support of this assertion, the
whole position will be examined and criticized as either intrinsically repre-
sentationistic or else untenable in the face of the facts of relativity and
error. Then, for good measure, the original constitution of our nature, as
revealed to Reid, will be considered, mainly along the lines initiated by
Priestley. In oonclusion a brief statement of the historical development of
the school through Stewart and Hamilton, with some remarks on Mills* treatment
of the problem will be formulated.
For once Reid is perfectly unambiguous in his utterance. Apparently
it was an unquestionable selfevident truth that the mind is an entity, and
no other possibility was conceivable. Hence little space need be wasted in
establishing the position.
"I take it for granted, upon the testimony of common sense, that my
mind is a substance - that is, a permanent subject of thought; and my reason
convinces me that it is an unextended and indivisible substance" (210. b).
"We define mind to be that which thinks" (220.b).
"But the mind is from its very nature a living and active being.
Everything we know of it implies life and active energy" (221. a).
"The thoughts of which I am conscious are the thoughts of a being
(TO
which I call mysel f, my_ mind, my. person " (443. t>).
What Reid conceived mind to be is perfectly clear; how he arrived at
his conception was as mysterious to him as it remains to us.
"We cannot prove the existence of our minds" (130. a) - "our notion
being not direct, but relative to its operations" (513. b).
"It appears, then, to be an undeniable fact that, from thought or
sensation, all mankind constantly and invariably, from the first dawning of
reflection, do infer a power or faculty of thinking, and a permanent being or
mind to which that faculty belongs; and that we as invariably ascribe all the
various kinds of sensation and thought we are conscious of to one Individual
mind or self. But by what rules of logic we make these inferences, it is im-
possible to show; nay it is impossible to show how our sensations and thoughts
can give us the very notion and conception either of a mind or of a faculty....
Yet the sensation suggests to us both a faculty and a mind; and not only sug-
gests a notion of them, but creates a belief of their existence, although it
is impossible to discover, by reason, any tie or connection between one and
the other" (110.b).
'Suggestion', Reid's good fairy has intervened once more in the
interest of his philosophy of common sense. Instead of the usual resulting
obscurity, however, obvious absurdity ensues. Suggestion is useless unless
there is sone one to whom the suggestion can be made. Now, if our mind be
identical with our self, or person (443. b), then Reid, in saying that a "sen-
sation suggests to us both a faculty and a mind", manifestly holds the mar-
velous doctrine that an act of the mind (115. a) suggests to that mind the con-
ception of that mind, and then makes the mind believe that that mind exists.
This is representationism gone mad. It was reasonable, if not consistent, for
Reid to hold that a sensation could, by its power of suggestion, cause the mind
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to conceive of the existence of external objects and to believe in them. In
such a situation the three terms involved in suggestion are all present: the
suggester, the thing suggested, and that to which the thing is suggested. Sug-
gestion of the kind Heid utilizes can be made only to a conscious being, or,
in Reid's language, to a mind. To know the mind solely in a representative
way through the medium of suggestion necessitates another mind that shall do
the knowing in that way. Each human being would then be of two minds, the first
mind knowing inferential! y that there is a second mind. The second mind is the
mind that feels, imagines, remembers, and thinks. Its acts suggest to the
first mind that the second mind exists. But the first mind is not known direct-
ly either. Its existence is a logical necessity to permit knowledge of the
existence of the second mind. If the first mind is not known directly, another
mind is needed to make the inference to the first mind. The additional mind
may be the second mind or a distinct member. If distinct, an infinite series
of minds has been started. If it be the second mind we find ourselves arguing
in a circle and caught in the most bewildering maze of representation and re-
representation that a realist in a solipsistic nightmare could possibly imagine.
His lost soul is condemned to wander with the introspect ionist who explicitly
sets his mind to work observing what itself is doing.
There are difficulties in Reid's view of mind quite apart from its
flagrantly non-realistic reduplicated representationism.
Having inferred a mind in order to make his system work, he ought
to be sure that it does work. Instead, he is quite sure that it does not.
"But how are the sensations of the mind produced by impressions upon
the body? Of this we are absolutely ignorant, having no means of knowing how
the body acts upon the mind, or the mind upon the body the manner of their
correspondence and intercourse is absolutely unknown" (187. a).
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Philosophie ally this is not quite fair. While it is a duty to ac-
knowledge and face facts, even though they upset the lamps of our theories and
leave us in darkness, it is an imposition to make assumptions intended to ex-
plain facts but actually productive of utter theoretical confusion. Assump-
tions are legitimately made to relieve difficulties, not to aggravate them.
The assumption of a substantial mind, however, transforms our perplexity into
absolute ignorance, by Reid's own admission. We are left in worse than simple
ignorance, since we are plunged into unreal problems which, but for this as-
sumption, need not have troubled us.
There is in the first place the gratuitous perplexity about the rela-
tion of this mind to other entities, and in particular to external objects.
As was shown in the second chapter, Reid has fallen into elementary representa-
tion isn; by bringing in sensations and thoughts, which are not external objects
and yet represent or suggest them to the mind. Suppose the mind to be not a
thing that must be related to other things, but itself a special relation be-
tween the living body and other things, and this particular problem disappears.
A special phase of this problem, ever present to dualietic realists,
is the fact of relativity in sense perception. The idealist is not obliged
to hold that there is any underlying identity in the different appearances of
what is regarded as the same object, for he is free to maintain that the ap-
pearances are separate and distinct things in themselves. The sceptic is of
course irresponsible. The realist, however, is bound to explain how themind's
awareness of external objects varies not only from individual to individual,
but also from time to time in the same individual. Why should not a mind
equipped for knowing real things really know them as they are. Yet it seems
as if the mind knows nothing more than mutilated representatives of real things.
A number of baffling questions immediately spring up: Which variant of the
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object is authentic? Is any one of them the object as it really is? Is there
a real object after all? When perceptions are interpreted as incipient bodily
responses to the environment, all these puzzles, which depend for their legiti-
macy on the hypothesis of a knowing or mirroring mind-substance, may be added
to the long list of foolish questions which need not be answered because they
presuppose absurdities.
Error and illusion cause further hardships to the realist. His mind
perceives and remembers incorrectly at times, and occasionally sees what isn't
there and recalls things that didn't happen. His mind, which should have been
in direct contact with reality and actually thought it was, deceived itself
completely until later experiences permitted correction and revision. From one
point of view, error and illusion are but pathological forms, so to speak, of
the general phenomenon of relativity, and do not therefore occasion fresh dif-
ficulties for theory. But in another aspect they show how dangerously close the
mind-substance theory carries its adherents to solipsism. Hallucinations and
dreams reveal the entitative mind acting in a solipsistic parallel to the con-
duct of such a mind in the real world.
Reid's attempts to explain some of the objections raised are found in
chapter 22 of the second of the "Essays on the intellectual powers of man"
(334-9).
The relation of the mind to other entities he has already declared an
ultimate mystery.
Relativity is admitted, but ascribed to "rash judgments" (336.b).
And these are due to "disorders of the understanding", such as deference to
authority, false analogizing, over-simplification, misapplication of genius,
rushing into opposite exlremes, perversion by passion and affection, tradition,
professional prejudice, ambiguity, false education (468-475), in short, rela-
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tivity is evidence of the imperfection of the mind. Since relativity is a
ubiquitous element in our experience, there is a radical inconsistency between
the explanation Reid has offered of it, and his assertion that, while our
senses, memory, and reason are liable to accidental disorders, "we have no reason
to think that God has given fallacious powers to any of his creatures: this
would be to think dishonorably of our Maker, and would lay a foundation for
universal scepticism" (335. a). But a power is essentially fallacious if it
is designed to mirror things as they really are, and succeeds only in delivering
more or less imperfect representatives of them. Passive perception must be
accurate; otherwise it is useless and misleading.
This consideration disposes of Reid's explanation of error, illusion,
and hallucination, which are phenomena too familiar in our mental life to be
treated as accidents. Realistic systems of the mind-substance type find as
much difficulty in accounting for the fact that we do see things as they really
are, as for the fact that we don't.
Reid's scapegoat in periods of exegetical muddling and disgrace is
th6 original constitution of our nature. Joseph Priestley, his most severe
contemporary critic, undertook to destroy this refuge. In his Works, volume III,
are included three essays and an appendix, all directed against Reid and his
followers, Oswald and Beattie. Priestley's remarks are high spirited through-
out and sometimes offensive. After a few passages have been quoted, a list of
Reid's instinctive and original principles of the constitution of our nature will
be subjoined, to close the criticism of the founder of common-sense philosophy.
In the preface to the three essays Priestley remarks that
n such a theory of the human mind as that of Dr. Reid, adopted
by Dr. Beattie and Dr. Oswald (if that can be called a theory which in fact
explains nothing), does not, indeed, require much study; but when you have given
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all possible attention to it, you find yourself no wiser than before. Dr. Reid
meets with a particular sentiment or persuasion, and not being able to explain
the origin of it, without more ado he ascribes it to a particular original
instinct, provided for that very purpose. He finds another difficulty, which
he also solves in the same concise and easy manner. And thus he goes on account-
ing for everything, by telling you, not only that he cannot explain it himself,
but that it will be in vain for you or any other person to investigate it far-
ther than he has done. Thus avowed ignorance is to pass for real knowledge"
(p. 11).
When Priestley wrote, Reid's Inquiry only had been published. The
critic's benediction is very tart:
11 if so many new and important truths have occurred to our
philosopher and guide in the examination of the five senses only, this small
corner of the human mind, what may we not expect from his farther progress?
Instinctive principles will then be as common and as cheap - but I forget the
proverb - and as many distinct independent laws of nature will be found in this
microcosm of man only, as have by others been thought necessary for the system
of the universe" (p. 67).
From the Inquiry Priestley gleaned a dozen or more instinctive prin-
ciples (III. 28) for which he gives the proper references (III 29-34). But a
list from the whole of Reid's collected writings with the page references may
be preferable.
1. Perception is a simple, original and inexplicable act of the mind (105b)
2. Memory likewise (105.b).
3. Imagination likewise (lC5.b).
4. Existence of our minds is a belief immediately inspired by our con-
stitution (110. a).
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5. Idea of space is given by original constitution of our nature (124. a).
6. Belief in external world (129. a).
7. Belief in uniformity of nature (337.a;451.a)
.
8. Belief in existence of other minds (441. a).
9. Belief in existence of everything of which we are conscious (442. b).
10. Belief in personal identity (445.b).
11. Belief in veracity of our senses (445.b).
12. Belief in freedom of will (446.b).
13. Belief in causation (455. a).
14. Psycho-physical interaction (528. a).
15. A number of moral and esthetic principles which are irrelevant here.
These with others that may have escaped our notice are the fundamentals
of common sense, as Heid states:
"If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the
constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a neces-
sity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being able to
give a reason for them - these sure what we call the principles of common sense;
and what is manifestly contrary to them is what we call absurd" (108.b).
Let us add the confident comment of Reid's greatest French commentator,
Victor Cousin, in conclusion:
"II reste, grace a Dieu, beaucoup a aj outer a cette philosophic, mais
il y a peu a retrancher; il y a lacunes a combler, il n'y a plus d'hypotheses
a detruire. Ni Heid ni Kant n'ont mis dans le monde une seule hypothese qui
fasse obstacle au XlXfsiecle" (Cours p. 108).
But the nineteenth century was more tolerant of unverifiable hypothe-
ses than the twentieth.
Dugald Stewart, who succeeded to Reid's position as head of the common
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sense school of philosophy
,
"gave a very clear and scholarly restatement of the
principles of the Common-Sense Philosophy. A man of great erudition and much
personal charm., and easily the foremost philosopher of the day in Britain, he
did more than any one else not merely to popularize that philosophy, but to
secure for it the respectful, and in some cases, the admiring, attention of
other philosophers"^
Stewart is Reid in a Sunday suit of clothes, instead of workshop attire
The founder's distinctive doctrines, the independent existence of external ob-
jects, and the substantiality of mind, are accepted and reiterated in more
pleasing, but hardly more convincing form. In some respects there is a depart-
ure from the original position, without noticeable improvement.
In the account of perception he refers his readers to his master,
promising that they "will find ample satisfaction in the writings of Dr. Reid"
(Works? 1.48). But a large part of the realistic position is jeopardized in
his subsequent contention "that, even on the supposition that certain impres-
sions on our organs of sense are necessary to awaken the mind to a conscious-
ness of its own existence, and to give rise to the exercise of its various
faculties, yet all this might have happened, without our having any knowledge
of the qualities, or even of the existence, of the material world" (Works . 1.74).
What is this but Berkeley's denial of 'matter 1 ?
in his account of memory Stewart finds difficulty in explaining the
quality of pastness which is inseparable from it. Reid had definitely stated
that the past object was in some sense present to the mind. This does not meet
*G-. A. Johnston, in his introduction to Selections from the Scottish Philosophy
of Common Sense (Chicago, 1915) p. 19.
2
The Works of Dugald Stewar t in 7 vol. (Cambridge, 1829).
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with Stewart's approval. Instead of considering memory a simple act of the
mind, he divides it into two parts: "the mind first forms a conception of the
event, and then judges from circumstances, of the period of time to which it
is to be referred; a supposition which is by no means a gratuitous one, invent-
ed to answer a particular purpose, but which, as far as I am able to Judge, is
agreeable to fact: for if we have the power, as will not be disputed, of con-
ceiving a past event without any reference to time, it follows, that there is
nothing in the ideas or notions which memory presents to us, which is necessari-
ly accompanied with a belief of past existence" (Works I. 299).
Stewart begs a considerable portion of the issue when he assumes it
will not be disputed that we can conceive past events without any reference
to time. It is no doubt possible to conceive past events and yet be unable
to date them specif ically, but that the event is past is a fact inseparable
from the conception. The reference to past time is an invariable concomitant,
even though the reference be inexact or simply nothing more than past. The
pastness must be an integral part of such a conception, for otherwise there is
nothing to prevent the 'mind* from judging the event to be in the absent
present or in the future or entirely out of the time series of real events.
Where Stewart tries to patch he succeeds as a rule in making evident
the need for repairs without showing technical skill adequate to the problem he
has discovered.
Sir William Hamilton, the editor of the definitive edition of Reid's
collected writings, appeared to regard himself as the thinker in whom the
philosophy of common sense found its complete and unimpeachable statement.
In this opinion he was supported by John Stuart Mill:
"Sir W. Hamilton's is the latest form of the Reidian theory; and by
no other of its supporters has that theory been so well guarded, or expressed
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in such discriminating terms, and with such studious precision. Though there
are a few points on which the earlier philosopher seems to me nearer the truth,
on the whole it is impossible to pass from Reid to Sir W. Hamilton, or from
Sir W. Hamilton back to Reid, and not be struck with the immense progress which
their common philosophy has made in the interval between them." (Examination of
Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy . (1889.6 .p. 137).
The progress made by Hamilton seemed more immense to Mill than it
really was. Had he been able to solve his own fundamental difficulties, the
Scottish school, even in all its later glory, must have remained in the state
of grand futility to which Reid had led it. Its essential weakness was Mill's
own weakness, while its apparent strength was easily resolved into Mill's weak-
ness. Both common sense and association philosophers found mind a stumbling
block, and the realist's ostensible externality of matter was easy game for
the sub jectivist. Accordingly, any marked improvement from Reid to Hamilton
must be one of form and statement, not of material doctrine. Reid already
had the cardinal doctrines of Scottish realism. Mill faced the same insupera-
ble difficulty of accounting for consciousness. Short of a revolution in
the theory of mind, there could be no progress except clearer presentation
and more extensive support from the history of philosophy.
It is commonly agreed that Mill has abundantly justified in the rest
of his Examination the estimate he gives of Hamilton in his concluding remarks
as a philosopher whose merits "chiefly consist in his clear and distinct mode
of bringing before the reader many of the fundamental questions of metaphysics;
some good specimens of psychological analysis on a small scale; and the many
detached logical and psychological truths which he has separately seized, and
which are scattered through his writings, mostly applied to resolve some special
difficulty and again lost sight of. I can hardly point to anything he has
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done towards helping the more thorough understanding of the greater mental phe-
nomena,, unless it be his theory of attention (including abstraction), which
seams to me the most perfect we have" (p. 633).
Before passing to the next chapter, which will endeavor to present
in connected form the pragmatic suggestions intended to relieve Scottish realism
of its false hypothesis and consequent gratuitous difficulties, let ue look at
Mill's own supreme problem and indicate a solution of it. This is in the nature
of a parenthesis or appendix to the remarks on the Scottish realism and is made
more because it illustrates the pragmatic method than because of any special
relevance to the main subject.
In his effective criticism of the realists' mind-substance doctrine,
Mill set up, as a more valid hypothesis, the associationist view of Hume and
his successors that mind is simply a succession of feelings. With his incompara-
ble candor he also called attention to the weakness of his own position in
these words:
"If, therefore, we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are
obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is
aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of
believing that the mind or ego is something different from any series of feelings,
or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which ex
hypothesi is but a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series.
"The truth is that we are here face to face with that final inexpli-
cability at which, as Sir W. Hamilton observes, we inevitably arrive when we
reach ultimate facts The real stumbling block is perhaps not in any
theory of the fact, but in the fact itself. The true incomprehensibility
perhaps is that something which has ceased, or is not yet in existence, can
still be, in a manner, present: that a series of feelings, the infinintely
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greater part of which is past or future, can yet be gathered up, as it were,
into a single present conception, accompanied by a belief of reality. I think
by far the wisest thing we can do is to accept the inexplicable fact, without
any theory of how it takes place: and when we are obliged to speak of it in
terms which assume a theory, to use them with a reservation as to their mean-
ing" (p. 248).
These words are in effect an abandonment of his previous support of
Hamilton who had criticized Reid for holding that in memory and in the percep-
tion of distant objects the things so known are immediately present to the
'mind' (p. 140-141). Reid had insisted "that something which has ceased, or is
not yet in existence, can still be, in a manner, present". Hamilton denied
this. Mill considered Hamilton's remarks "correct, and a great improvement
upon Reid" (p. 141), and then confessed the necessity of acknowledging as an
'inexplicable fact' what Reid had attempted to incorporate in his theory
(p. 248).
Pragmatic theory agrees with Reid, and with Mill in his second view,
that the past and the distant present are in some manner present. It rejects
Reid's pseudo-explanatory dogmatism; it also refuses to be satisfied with
Mill's surrender to inexplicable facts. Mill's mental-state or etream-of-
thoughts theory of the mind could not account adequately for the phenomena of
memory, identity, anticipation, and imagination. Had he regarded mind as a
name for the body while it is responding to the future, he need not have re-
garded matter as an inferred possibility of sensation, nor elementary conscious
operations as inexplicable facts. The slowly changing body accounts for per-
sonal identity, its repeated and related responses to external objects permit
us to regard the remembered and the distant and the expected object as in a
manner present. The detailed explanation follows in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER V
PRAGMATIC RECONSTRUCTION
Throughout the preceding chapters, whenever the theory under considera-
tion was found wanting, a few suggestions indicating a more adequate doctrine
were advanced and a promise of fuller exposition in the concluding chapter given.
The time to redeem that promise is now come, and every effort will be made to
satisfy the patient reader who has been lured on by hope of better things.
Nevertheless it must be stated in advance that the criticism of the older posi-
tion derives whatever force it may have from considerations independent of the
validity of the pragmatic position. The reconstruction is tentative, plausible
perhaps, but not essential to the overthrow of Scottish realism.
The point has been consistently urged throughout this essay, that no
radical departure from the lines laid down by Locke is possible unless the
conception of mind as a thing distinguishable from the body is surrendered.
Reid and his followers attacked the 'ideal hypothesis', but unsuspectingly ac-
cepted the mind- 3ubstance doctrine, though that was an equally dubious hypothe-
sis. Th3 logical outcome in subjectivism and scepticism is apparent when the
'common-sense' dogmatism that obscures it is ignored. Accordingly, the first
requisite for reconstruction is a denial of mind as a thing or entity. When
this has been established, it will be possible to apply the new conception
in turn to the phenomena of perception, memory, and imagination, and to discard
a host of assumptions. Finally, the abyss of subjectivism will be left on one
side, and a rehabilitated modified realism may be attained.
We may contrast, by example, the behavior of the human body when it
is conscious, with its behavior when unconscious. If, while I am lying in an
upper berth in a pullman car reading, my hat hung precariously above me is dis-
lodged by a violent jolt, I probably will duck my head or put up my hand in or-
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der to prevent the hat from hitting me in the face. I respond before I am
actually struck, anticipating what is about to happen and organizing my
behavior accordingly.
The unconscious body responds in quite a different manner. Had I
been aslesp when the hat began to descend, it would have fallen down all the
way and actually touched my face, before there was any bodily response. Then
a turning of the head might have followed or a movement of the arm and hand to
brush away the hat, as a sleeping baby brushes off a fly.
The outstanding difference between conscious and unconscious action
lies, therefore, not so much in the actual movements constituting the response -
for these may be the same - but in the time of executing them with reference
to their causes. In consciousness the response is made to an expected cause,
portended but not yet present in the same sense as is the cause to which the
unconscious body responds. Behavior is controlled by the future acting in the
present. That is the distinguishing feature of conscious response. The real
dispute between pragnatists and the adherents of a mind-substance theory arises
over the localization of that control. The older view places the control
in the 'mind'. But if the mind is rather a condition or process than a thing
or agent, the control must be sought elsewhere. The pragmatist puts it in the
ob j ect
.
There are a number of objects exercising mysterious control over
other objects, and the hypothesis that a spirit within them performed the un-
usual functions was once very popular. In the inorganic world, for example,
is the phenomenon of magnetism, operating seemingly at a distance and inter-
fering with the ordinary gravitational behavior of iron. Magnetic force was
at one time attributed to the control of a thing or spirit residing within the
magnetized body. We have now, as it seems, discarded this entitative concep-
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tion; perhaps the mind-sub stance notion will go the same way.
When iron first solidified in the course of cosmic development, and
responded to magnetic influence, a new form of behavior made its appearance.
Whether this novelty was 'contained' or 'implied' in the previous situation
seems an idle question. Implication is a useful concept where purpose is in-
volved, for then the question how an event has happened enlarges into the prob-
lem why it has taken place. Otherwise, we need but be reasonably persistent
in order to find ourselves asking what the universe was implied or contained
in. If the answer be, in the mind of God, the truly faithful disciple of
philosophy must remain loyal to his creed and respectfully inquire what in the
name of creation 'contained' the mind of God.
This conveniently opens the subject of the human mind and its relation
to antecedent conditions. Is mind implied in a preexisting mindless situation?
Manifestly there is this previous question: What do we mean by 'mind' and 'mind-
less'? The answer has already been given in part. Mind is always in some sense
a factor in situations in which an organism responds to those qualities of an
object which portray results not yet present but to come. So the question of
implication must mean: Can a situation in which there is no response to future
qualities develop into one in which such a response does occur? It is therefore
a question of the same sort as that concerning magnetism, namely, Can a situation
in which there is no response to magnetic qualities develop into one in which
there is such response? The answer is the same in both cases. Either the uni-
verse exhibits the constant novelty insisted on by Heraclitus, or there is an
infinite regress of implication.
The original problem of the chapter now reappears. Whether control
by the future is localized in the 'mind', or is a characteristic of the whole
conscious situation is the matter in dispute. In eliminating the question of
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implication, the issue narrows to th9 point of deciding whether the mind-sub-
stance or pragmatic view is the more satisfactory. Having noted th9 extraor-
dinary difficulties in which Reid and other supporters of the older view
became involved,, we should now be inclined to a more tolerant consideration
of the pragmatic proposals.
Mind is a name for a mode of behavior, just as instinct is. Neither
is a thing or agent, but simply a condition or process. Assuming then that
we have a mind-situation when an organism responds to control by those quali-
ties in an object which reveal to the organism the results of carrying out
incipient responses, let us see how this works out in the case of perception,
memory, and imagination.
If pragmatism be old enough to possess classics in its still meager
literature, Dewey's criticism of Bergson combined with exposition of the prag-
matic doctrine of perception^- must occupy an undisputed place. The fragmen-
tary sketch which now follows is based mainly upon that article.
While perception always involves bodily response to an object, not
every bodily response is of theperceptual kind. During sleep, for example, there
are countless responses made by the body, yet by hypothesis not one is perceptual.
The principal reason for this is that the stimulus is all readymade before
it stimulates, and the response works out mechanically and predeterminedly
.
The response on the perceptual level is tentative and indeterminate, directed
toward a stimulus that changes in the process. This is because the stimulus
is, at the outset, insufficient or unsuited to the calling out of an adequate
response. Where response is prompt and decisive, we have complete action, not
the preliminaries to action that are the essence of perception. When the pro-
cess of interaction between incomplete stimulus and incomplete response works
^John Dewey: "Perception and Organic Action" in Journal of Philosophy, Psychology
and Scientific Methods. IX. 645. (1912)
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toward the development of a complete response through the emergence of a com-
plete stimulus or object, bodily action is on the perceptual level.
The manner in which this takes place is possibly as follows. The body
organized to adjust itself mechanically in many ways to the constantly changing
environment, meets at times with situations to which prompt adaptation is
impossible because the machinery of response has not been organized to meet
such occasions directly. Two results are then possible. Either there is a
continuance of direct responsesbut in a futile incoherent way issuing in waste
and harm to the organism unless luck be with it, or these responses may become
organized through the mediation of a system that supplements the direct-action
mechanisms. The responses set off by a baffling stimulus gp,on the second sup-
position, to the higher brain centers to be made up into an adequate organic
response. But this is impossible unless the character of the stimulus begins
changing at the same time into one adequate to the final response.
What, therefore, is an object? It is not an unchanging immutably
perduring entity, it is an invitation to the body to act in a particular way.
Usually the invitation is accepted, but when it asks the impossible, the invi-
tation must be modified. The incipient partial responses that reach the higher
centers are anticipations of the results that complete response would bring.
A perceived object is a display of what will happen in case certain responses
are carried out. This display will vary manifestly with the nature of the
response, and the response varies point by point with the nature of the
display.
Accordingly Dewey can say, "this functional transformation of the
environment under conditions of uncertain action into conditions for determining
an appropriate organic response constitutes perception". Locke's notion of
2 op. cit. p. 659.
t
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copying or mirroring has gone. Reid's "suggestion 1 is more accurate, but not
in his sense of merely indicating the existence of external things. It is
a suggestion to act, made by the object to the body in successively more
compelling forms, and not an invitation to believe made by a subjective sensa-
tion to a mind.
Two paragraphs from Bewey (p. 666-7) will indicate the workings of
the organizing system:
"Let us suppose the disturbance reaches the brain by way of the
visual organ. If directly discharged back to the motor apparatus of the eyes
this results not in a perception, but in an eye-movement. But simultaneously
with this reaction there is also a dispersal into the areas connected with
tasting, handling, and touching. Each of these structures also initiates an
incidental reflex discharge. But this is not all; there is also a cross-dis-
charge between these cortical centers. No one of these partial motor dis-
charges can become complete, and so dictate, as it were, the total direction of
organic activity until it has been coordinated with the others. The fulfilment
of, say, eating, depends upon a prior act of handling, this upon one of reach-
ing, and this upon one of seeing; while the act of seeing necessary to stim-
ulate the others to appropriate execution can not occur save as it, in turn, is
duly stimulated by the other tendencies to action. Here is a state of inhibi-
tion. The various tendencies wait upon one another and they also get in one
another's way. The sensori-motor apparatus provides not only the conditions
of this circle, but also the way out of it.
"How can this be? It is clear that if, under the condition supposed,
the act of seeing were overtly complete it would then furnish the needed stim-
ulus of reaching, this to handling and so on. The sensory aspect of the
apparatus is, in its nature, a supplying of this condition. The excitation
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of the optical area introduces the quality of seeing, connected (through the
simultaneous excitation of the areas of reaching, tasting, and handling) with
the specific qual ities of the other acts. The qual ity of movement, or action,
is supplied by the sensory aspect, is in effect, an anticipation of the result
of the act when overtly perforrced. With respect to determining the needed
stimulus, it is as if the overt responses in question had been actually exe-
cuted. "
The immediate presence of the object and the functioning of an appara-
tus of suggestion, the two novel elements in Reid's account of perception, find
their place in the pragmatic reconstruction. But the mind as an entity dis-
appears 4 Mind is the condition or process obtaining when the body responds
to control by the foreshadowed consequences in the object. It is a conscious
situation, which means that the control is not mechanical and predetermined
but emerges and develops in the situation itself.
Memory is a complicated case of perception, owing to the presence
in the object of a quality we may call 'pastness 1 . In plain words this seems
to mean that in the object now before us there is something which shows us that
the object is not now before us but was so previously. This absurdity arises
out of a copy or mirror-theory of consciousness, adapted to the special needs
of the memory experience. It is a view that will hold no better here than
elsewhere.
The distinguishing feature of consciousness being bodily response to
future-revealing qualities, memory must be regarded as a particular form of
this kind of behavior. Fundamentally memory is a forward-looking process,
analytically it is looking backward for the sake of looking ahead. "If the
remembering is efficacious and pertinent, it reveals the possibilities of the
present; that is to say, it clarifies the transitive, transforming character

-49-
3
that belongs inherently to the present".
The actual problem is to show how the past can function in the
present to guide the organism for the future. None of the older schools is
very eager to approach the memory puzzle, or very happy in dealing with it.
For absolute idealists, time is a problem for finite minds only, and consequent-
ly not worth prolonged consideration. For some realists, explanation is de-
clared impossible; for others, the present is supposed to be transcended in
some way considered ultimate or unique; still others abolish time by regarding
the past as real in a sense that is indistinguishable from the real present,
exactly as they make error real and not to be discriminated from truth. If
pragmatists can offer nothing more than a moderately plausible theory, that in
itself will be an advance on the current doctrines.
Memory is a special form of interrupted consciousness. It is an
unexpected rerouting of the ordinary process of remolding the environment
and organizing the tangled bodily responses for suitable organic action. Past-
ness is the quality revealed in an object when it resists the habitual trans-
formation into a more adequate stimulus and demands a different remaking if
satisfactory adjustment is to follow. This summary account requires elabora-
tion.
In ordinary perception, to repeat the pragmatic thesis, a situation
in which automatic or unconscious response is unsatisfactory remodels itself
along two lines, the object becoming a more and more suitable stimulus, the
responses becoming more and more appropriate for organic action. This twofold
process depends for its development and completion on the reciprocal action
of both sides. Neither can proceed very long without the other. The environ-
ment will not change into a more satisfactory stimulus unless the responses
*John Dewey: "Experience and Idealism" in Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and
QUiex £a£aya. p. 221. (1910).
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continue to tend in the direction of greater organization. On the other hand,
this organization proceeds only in conjunction with the corresponding trans-
formation of the environment.
In a memory-situation the environment fails to carry out its part.
The ordinary perceptual start is made, the remodeling continues for a time,
and then a hitch or break occurs on the environmental side, throwing the or-
ganization of the response out of gear. The response is not supported in the
usual way by the corresponding phase in the environment. There is a gap which
is not filled in by anything else, but occupied in a way by the object-as-absent.
Its presence in this sense controls the subsequent procedure. The customary
smoothly reciprocating support, however, is wanting. This particular lack
of present support is the quality of pastness In an object. When the environ-
ment is sufficiently plastic to help reorganization along more or less habitual
lines of response, the whole perceptual process goes through to its appropriate
completion and the object emerges finally as a proper stimulus owing to its
display in present form of the results that will ordinarily follow on organic
action. But when this development is checked because of a refractory environ-
ment, the object emerges, not as a final stimulus, but still as a guide to
conduct with reference to the future. It must be present to the organism
in some form in order to control behavior. It is present in a different way
from that in which objects are mechanically present. It is, to use Dewey's
scheme of expression, present-as-absent-though-formerly-present. Pastness
has its future value, as significant as that of present perception, though the
control leads to different organic action.
Let us consider an example. Suppose I walk into a certain university
building and proceed down the corridor and enter my office. So far my actions
are in large part the automatic sequences of habitual behavior. On opening
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my desk,, however, a situation demanding more than automatic responses succeeds.
Letters invite opening and reading, periodicals suggest perusal, blanks suggest
being filled out, books being returned to the library, pictures being looked
at, drawers being opened, pencils being sharpened. To obtain some reasonable
stimulus for calling out a satisfactory organic response, organization is impera-
tive. As this proceeds, the situation begins to offer more competent guidance.
The elements fall into some kind of order. The blanks to be filled out assume
the right of way. They suggest peace with the dean, students put at rest and
so on. As this stimulus becomes more definite and the incipient responses less
inchoate, the actual procedure becomes mapped out. The blanks to be filled out
become in greater detail blanks for which pen is to be taken up, class cards
to be consulted and the rest. Before actual organic action takes place it is
rehearsed, as described above in the quotation from Dewey regarding the machin-
ery of perception.
Now suppose the rehearsal comes to a sudden stop because the habitual
development from class-cards-to-be-consulted does not take place. The cards
are not 'there' to help in the reconstitution. The momentum of the perceptual
process had carried the organization of the responses on to the point where
the usual support from the class-cards was needed if the operation was to be
completed. This was not forthcoming and the response to the cards in its
original form therefore breaks down. The situation had begun to point to the
cards in their customary place, but only to reveal them as present in the sense
of controling conduct by their former presence. Their failure to stimulate
response in their accustomed way calls forth other responses. The situation
points in new directions. The break in the transformation is made a part of
the reconstitution of the stimulus. The cards originally pointed to as cards
to be consulted are now pointed to perhaps as cards to be brought from my desk
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at home and then consulted, or less definitely as cards to be found somewhere
and then consulted. Precise dating and locating is a further development.
The analysis of memory finds its corresponding descriptive elements
in the account just given. The chief features are, that the remembered object
was present in a certain sense and is now not present in that sense. The prag-
matic theory covers the first in calling attention to the shaping up of the
situation and the organization of response as though the object were there.
This could not happen unless in some way or other it already had been there,
or specifically somewhere, once before, since the pointing is largely a habit-
phenomenon dependent on past experience. The second point is provided for
when the temporary breakdown of the environmental reconstitution is emphasized.
If the pointing were correct the object would function as anticipated, but
this is not the case. Hence we arrive at the conception of memory as a special
form of interrupted consciousness, and of pastness as that quality in the
object which turns perception in a direction abruptly different from that in
which it was proceeding when the normal transformation of the stimulus came
to a stop.
The merit of Rsid's account of memory lies in its insistence that
somehow the remembered object is actually present at the time of remembering.
The revised version attempts to show how this is possible by virtue of the
control which the object as absent now exercises over the organism.
The radical weakness of Reid is attributable once more to the mind-
substance hypothesis which should have been discarded when the far less vicious
'ideal hypothesis' was thrown overboard. An original faculty of the 'mind'
is held to suggest belief in the past existence of an object, and there the
matter is supposed to end. This kind of suggestion is obviously part and parcel
of the machinery of subjectivism. The mind is at the mercy of suggestions.
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The pragmatic doctrine tries to avoid the snare by refusing to deal with an
entitative mind. Subjectivism is thus impossible.
The difficulties of the static picturing theory are also circumvented.
Relativity and error are accounted for in memory as in perception by regarding
these functions of consciousness as factors in the control of the organic
adjustment to the environment for the safety and progress of the organism, not
as faculties of a mind exercised for their ovm sakes or for the sake of the
mind itself. People remember differently because they have built up different
habit cycles or patterns which lead up to different anticipations of the object
that is remembered. And the same person doss not always remember the same thing
in the same way because the memory-object is called upon to function in dif-
ferent situations and because the habit cycle is modified by the different
environments in which it operates. Relativity and its extreme phase of error
are facts that strengthen the pragmatic theory as much as they damage other
doctrines of knowing.
A theory of memory is put severely to the proof when it is examined
in the light of the phenomenon of imagination. It is much easier to keep
memory-objects distinct from objects of perception than from objects of imagi-
nation. Imagination has several characteristics in common with memory. No
complete organic action, for example, is possible toward either remembered or
imagined objects. They control ultimate action by helping to determine the
organization of the final response, and they play a part, therefore, in the
environment that is being reconstituted in perception; but in neither case is
there the direct bodily contact and actual material rearrangement that is the
mark of complete organic action. Remembered and imagined objects are alike,
further, in being beyond the reach of impersonal devices for learning more about
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them. They can not be measured, weighed, photographed, electrified, made to
enter chemical combinations, as 'real' objects in the popular sense can be.
The differences between memory and imagination are much more signifi
cant for our present purpose than the points of similarity. The remembered
object is one that has suffered, or has been immediately liable to suffer,
organic action. The imagined object is ipso facto out of the range of com-
plete organic response in the situation in which it is being imagined. Were
it liable now, it would be an object within the scope of perception; had it
been liable previously, it would be subject to memory. Remembered objects,
furthermore, were at one time accessible to camera, or meter or scales or
testtube or electric current; imagined objects as such are at no time availa-
ble for such impersonal investigation of them.
Like all other forms of consciousness, imagination is a form of
control exercised over the organism by the future. The future results are em-
bodied in the imagined object, and it is therefore essential for effective
control that the object be in some sense present to the organism. Two main
points must be accounted for; first, how the imagined object comes into being,
second, in what sense it is present as a controlling factor to the organism.
And each must be kept clearly distinct from the corresponding points in memory
Conscious behavior arises from the breakdown of automatic or reflex
adjustment of the organism to the environment. When the problem is purely
the reciprocal building up of a satisfactory stimulus out of the material en-
vironment and a satisfactory organic response, the conscious behavior is per-
ceptual. When the steady stream of conscious behavior is interrupted by the
conflict arising between habitual response and a suddenly non-reciprocating
environment, so that the object, to judge from the response, is 'there', but
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to judge from the environment is not, the process is memory. But when there
is a breakdown of adjustment, whether automatic or conscious, such that the
material environment does not aid in reorganixation or such that no habitual
response tends to become dominant in conflict with environmental pressure, then
the stage is set for imagination.
This frequently occurs when there has been a general lowering of the
tension between body and material environment although adjustment is still
incomplete. There is, to be sure, a great difference in degree between gross
elementary imaginings and the subtlest refinements of a highly sensitive or-
ganism; none, it would seem, in kind. Certain bodily needs failing of im-
mediate satisfaction are responsible for the existence of imagined objects that
control further response by projecting the object that would satisfy into
4
consciousness. The material environment is present ponderably enough to
prevent complete organic response to the imagined object, but not emphatically
enough to secure this response to itself, -phis failure to stimulate complete
organic response toward themselves distinguishes imagined from perceived ob-
jects. To distinguish them from remembered objects is more difficult. But
first an illustration.
The sphere of nutrition may provide an example of the genesis of
imagined objects. In order to exist at all, the body must be nourished. The
metabolic circuit is fundamentally very simple, and it makes little difference
where we start. Food is converted into energy, which is expended in action,
4For the application of this doctrine to philosophy, art and religion, see
H. M. Kallen: "Value and Existence" in Creative. Intelligence by John
Dewey and others. N.Y. 1917.
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making imperative the consumption of more food to be converted into more
energy. Anabolisra leads to catabolisra, which again necessitates anabolism,
and so on until death. Each link in each step touches off the next. "An act
of swallowing, performed unconsciously, may start the complicated process
of digestion, but it is merely the first act of a series. There is no evidence
that the movements of the stomach and of the other organs concerned in diges-
tion must be presupposed before the act of swallowing can take place. The
swallowing may start the other processes, but we can not say that these other
processes react back upon the first act and make it one of swallowing rather
than of something else."*
Now suppose that for some reason a link does not function. Anabolism
should follow upon protracted catabolism, but the ordinary sequence does not
take place because, let us assume, there is no food. For a purely automatic
organism the failure of any link ultimately means death. For conscious organ-
isms there is another way out. The continued maladjustment produces unsatisfac-
tory responses that go to higher centers for organization. But if the material
environment is not ready to take its part in securing a better situation, the
abortive responses bring about some sort of felt quality of what the fully
adequate response would be under conditions suitable for proper adjustment.
In this way hunger may produce a feast as the imagined object, balked sex
reflexes may bring forth imagined loves, and frustrated activities of various
kinds call out their normal complements in imagination. But always the material
environment stands heavily in the way of complete organic response to imagined
^B. H. Bode: "Consciousness and Psychology" in Creative Intelligenc e (p. 233).
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objects. The direct control of bodily behavior is as much dependent on the
material environment as on the special bodily needs that help to give direction
to organic activity. The imagined object is not 'real 1 because of the brute
veto on complete response to it that is interposed by the material environment.
The human being is so interminably complex in organization that
organic needs incredibly remote from the elementary ones of food and sex have
their share in the determination of his adjustment to his surroundings. It
is apparent that their satisfaction must be encompassed largely if at all by
the indirect route of imagination. The fancies of classical mythology and the
concepts of present day religion are imaginings of this kind. It is not un-
reasonable to hold that dinner and deity as objects of imagination are generi-
cally identical in genesis and function, but the need embodied and projected
in the notion of God arises at a mors complicated stage of bodily organization
than that incorporated in a meal.
"My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? Why art thou so far
from helping me, and from the words of my roaring?" laments the psalmist. Prag-
matically interpreted this means that the organism we designate as the psalmist
was so constituted that the failure of certain adjustments for protection and
furtherance caused a rerouting of the futile responses to the higher centers
of the nervous system. Here their activity resulted in an incipient bodily
set, suitable to start complete organic response toward an environment in which
some agency had provided the protection and furtherance. But the actual mater-
ial environment precluded the complete response. The agency was therefore
projected as the link necessary but for the time inoperative in bringing about
the desired adjustments. When conditions changed favorably, the unknown fac-
tors in the transf otftation were definitively personified as God, and the
psalmist was able to sing, "The Lord is my strength and my shield; my heart
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trusted in him, and I am helped." The psalmist is in the mood for edification,
the pragmatist for analysis and explanation.
The mode of control exercised by the imagined object over the
organism now becomes manifest. The object is a projection into consciousness
of the specific thing needed for promoting a satisfactory disposition of the
needs of the organism. This projection advances direct readjustment to the
material environment by helping to modify organic action in the direction in-
dicated by the ineffectual responses. It defines the destination but not the
means of arriving there. Imagination is instrumental in influencing percep-
tion. The quality of the responses already involved in the reconstitution
of the environment and the organization of adequate organic action is changed
in accordance with the imagined goal.
The special quality of imagined objects, their datelessness in the
real time series, results from the nature of their origin in the failure of
the material environment to cooperate for bodily adjustment. They are not,
and they were not, 'out there'. The organism needs them somewhere but fails
at the time to obtain them.
The specific difference between memory and imagination is traceable
in the end to the different roles played by the material environment in each
case. In memory a hitherto favorably reacting environment suddenly leaves
the conscious process in the lurch. The customary responses are met by a gap
that interferes with the usual flow of cooperation. The memory-object is
a compound of organism acting as if the object were present and of the material
environment suddenly showing that the object is absent. The pastness of memory
is the conflict between habitual response leading in one direction and the
environment leading in another. The composition of these two forces, one
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making for presence of the object, the other against presence, results in
pastness of the object,, that is, present-as-f orderly-present . In imagination
the material environment is not so ready to cooperate but is armed with a
pock6t veto on complete organic response toward the imagined object. The
memory-object is a definite and immediate control, playing its essential
part in the guidance of the organism. The object of imagination does indeed
control conduct, but more as does a hill toward which we bend our steps
than as the paths and gates that constitute the route. Memory-leading is
of the nature of means, imagination-leading of ends. The first is a vital
element in the material environmental stimulus, the second is rather in the
world than of it.
Reid steadily insisted that the imagined object is in some sense
present. The account now offered may'give his assertion some consistent mean-
ing. The object is present in the sense of controlling conduct, making the
future, as displayed in the environmental present, actually different as a
guide to the organism. Reid's conception of the mind as a substance or agent
made it difficult to regard imagined or remembered objects as present and
difficult to distinguish them from one another. The proposal to treat mind
as a general name for behavior controlled by the future-revealing qualities
in the environment permits the conception of objects as present whenever
they exercise such control. The presence is of different sorts varying with
the nature of the control. Thus we have objects controlling in the ways we
call perception, memory, and imagination. In the generic sense they are
present in any of these ways, but an object may be absent in one specific
way although present nevertheless in some other.
Priestley vigorously assailed Reid and the Scottish school generally
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because of the large number of underconstrable assumptions that were found
necessary for the successful operation of the realistic theory. A partial
list of these was made in the preceding chapter (p. 35). Pragmatism works
with one fundamental concept, that of response to the future. Each of the
various 'faculties' and 'beliefs' is a variant on this dominant theme, whose
ever-recurring note is functional transformation, guidance for organic action,
control by display of the future in the present.
"I wish", wrote Hume to a friend after looking over some of Reid's
philosophical sketches, "that the parsons would confine themselves to their
old occupation of worrying one another, and leave philosophers to argue with
temper, moderation, and good manners."" Perhaps our corcrr: or.- sense Scotch parson
would have had the same feeling about this attempt to worry him, had he survived
into the era of the pragmatic revelation.
Quoted by Dugald Stewart from a letter to Dr. Blair. (Collected Writings
of Thomas Re id. p . 7b
.
)
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APPENDIX
Writer born 1888 in Milwaukee,, Wisconsin.
Milwaukee public schools 1893-1906.
University of Wisconsin 1907-1911 (B.A.).
Oxford University 1911-1914 (B.A.).
University of Illinois (assistant in philosophy) 1914-1917.
General philosophical training received from a number of men; three years of
pragmatic discipline under B. H. Bode.
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